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A GENERAL THEORY FOR MEASURING SELLER'S
DAMAGES FOR TOTAL BREACH OF CONTRACT

Robert ]. Harris*

T

ordinary remedy for breach of contract is the award of
expectation damages,1 measured so that the award, plus that
part of defendant's performance which plaintiff received, will give
plaintiff the economic equivalent2 of the status he would have enjoyed had he and defendant performed the contract as promised.3
I£ defendant's breach is serious4 and plaintiff's duty to perform
was conditioned upon defendant's proper performance,5 the
breach not only entitles plaintiff to sue for expectation damages,
it also gives him the legal power to refuse to render the balance
HE

• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. - Ed.
The author gratefully acknowledges the extensive assistance of Kenneth Graham,
University of Michigan Law School, '62.
1 This article is concerned with expectation damages-those fashioned to give
plaintiff as good a status as he would have enjoyed had the contract been fully performed by all parties. This is the normal measure of damages in almost all situations.
McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 137 (1935). Breach of a promise to repay money and, in some
states, a good faith failure to keep a promise to deliver good title to land give rise to
damages which are less than expectation damages. McCORJIUCK, DAMAGES § 178 (1935).
Where plaintiff cannot prove his expectation damages with certainty, he is usually
permitted to recover his expenditures made in reliance on the contract. See discussion
in 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1035 (1951) ; Fuller&: Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). A total breach which results in unjust enrichment of
the breaching party at the expense of the plaintiff normally is the occasion for a
restitution suit. 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1104 (1951), unless the breach has given rise to a
debt. Id., § 1110.
Although the courts often tend to blur the distinction between these three, the author
regards them as distinct remedies, and the present article is confined to situations wliere
the court is pursuing the expectation damage remedy.
2 Generally there is no recovery for harm to psychic interest. See 5 CORBIN, CoN1"RACTS
§ 1076 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 145 (1935); 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 341
(1932) ; Annots., 84 A.L.R. 1345 (1933) , 23 A.L.R. 372 (1923) •
3 The goal of restoring plaintiff to this status is subordinated to several other policies, as
indicated on pp. 583•84 infra. But if none of these overriding policies is present, plaintiff's
expectation interest is vindicated completely. See Atlas Trading Corp. v. S. H. Grossman,
Inc., 169 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1948); Silberstein v. Duluth News-Tribune Co., 68 Minn.
430, 71 N.W. 622 (1897); Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (1858); cf. Jones v. Van Patten, 3
Ind. 107 (1851). See generally 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 270 (1937); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 992 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES§ 137 (1935); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 329, comment a (1932) ; 1 SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES 25 (9th ed. 1912) •
4 See generally 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 946 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 142, at
582 (1935); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 313 (1) (1932) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1290
(1931).
15 E.g., Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 17 (1900); Carlson v. Doran, 252 Minn. 449, 90
N.W.2d 323 (1958); Nichols v. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N.Y. 471, 33 N.E. 561 (1893). See
also 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 637 (1960); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1329 (1931).
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of plaintiff's promised performance.6 When plaintiff first exercises
this power and then sues for expectation damages, the "savings"
which the plaintiff enjoyed by exercise of the power must be taken
into account in measuring damages. 7
What plaintiff saved upon breach is only the first of three elements that go into all formulae for measuring ordinary contract
damages. These savings must be deducted from the second element, the value to plaintiff of the difference between what defendant promised to do and what defendant in fact did to perform
the contract-in other words, the unpaid balance of the price.8
The last element in all expectation damage formulae often is
called "consequential damages" or "incidental damages." 9 The
object of this element is to compensate plaintiff for his reasonable post-breach expenditure made in an effort to mitigate the
consequences of breach. This element arises only if plaintiff
actually incurred such expenditure after breach and before trial.
Plaintiff's obligation to mitigate damages,10 or, as it is sometimes called, the doctrine of avoidable consequences,11 often requires the plaintiff to exercise his power to stop work.12 Failure
to exercise it is visited by oblique sanction: 13 when the court
6 E.g., Lowe v. Harwood, 139 Mass. 133 (1885); Lee v. Briggs, 99 Mich. 487, 58 N.W.
477 (1894) ; Brazell v. Cohn, 32 Mont. 556, 81 Pac. 339 (1905) •
7 Cf. Bullard v. Eames, 219 Mass. 49, 106 N.E. 584 (1914); Mays v. Hartman, 81 Ohio
App. 408, 77 N.E.2d 93 (1947). See also 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1038 (1951); McCORMICK,
DAMAGES § 143 (1935); REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 335 (1932),
8 Frequently judges, commentators, and draftsmen of statutes describe this element
elliptically, referring to it as "the contract price," rather than "the unpaid balance of the
contract price." E.g., the Uniform Sales Act (§ 64) provides that "the measure of damages
is . • • the difference between the contract price and the market or current price • • • ."
The decided cases, however, make it clear that the thought, amplified, is the unpaid
balance of the contract price. See, e.g., Bradford Novelty Co. v. Technomatic, Inc.,
142 Conn. 166, II2 A.2d 214 (1955); Sal's Furniture Co. v. Peterson, 86 R.I. 203, 133 A.2d
770 (1957).
9 See Development Co. of America v. King, 170 Fed. 923 (2d Cir. 1909); UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CooE § 2-710; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1044 (1951); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 171
(1933) • But see SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES, ch. 3 (1st ed. 1847) •
10 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1039 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 33-42 (1935);
REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 336 (1932) ; 1 SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES 385 (9th ed. 1912) •
11 See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1039 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 33 (1935); 1
SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES § 203 (9th ed. 1912) •
12 E.g., Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929); Heaver
v. Lanahan, 74 Md. 493, 22 Atl. 263 (1891); Wigent v. Marrs, 130 Mich. 609, 90 N.W.
423 (1902); Clark v. Marsiglia, l Denio 317 (N.Y. 1845).
13 This fact is often referred to as a "duty to mitigate." This is a misnomer. See
Rock v. Vandine, 106 Kan. 588, 189 Pac. 157 (1920) ; McClelland v. Climax Hosiery
Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605 (1930) (Cardozo, Ch.J., concurring); 5 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1039, at 205 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 33, at 128 (1935); 1 SEDGEWICK,
DAMAGES § 202 (9th ed. 1912) ; Annot., 81 A.L.R. 282 (1932) •
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comes to measure plaintiff's damages it will treat him as though
he had exercised the power and stopped work immediately upon
notice of breach. Thus plaintiff's actual or potential savings14
upon exercise of this power are an important part of damage measurement both in cases where plaintiff exercised the power and in
cases where he should have done so, but failed to do it.
This article is concerned with the legal rules which should
govern the process of valuing what plaintiff saved by exercising
his power to stop further performance upon notice of defendant's
serious breach. Where plaintiff is a "buyer" (whether he buys
land, services, personalty, or the temporary use of some kind of
property), and he was to pay the price in dollars, 15 few difficulties
arise in valuing his saved performance. But if he was a "seller"
of any of those commodities, valuation is hard. Thus our inquiry
is chiefly concerned with cases in which plaintiff is a "seller," not
a "buyer."16
Valuation-the process of translating something into a quantity of dollars-usually gets little direct discussion in the reported
opinions concerned with measurement of contract damages. 17 The
rules governing it must be inferred from the results affirmed or
reversed and from the cryptic clues afforded by elliptical generalizations. An example of the latter is the Uniform Sales Act's familiar codification of the common-law rule:
"Section 64. Action for damages for non-acceptance of goods." (3) Where there is an available market for the goods in
question, the measure of damages is, in the absence of special
circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater
amount, the difference between the contract price and the
market or current price at the time or times when the goods
ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the refusal to accept."
14 If he mitigates, his savings are actual; if he should have, they are potential.
15 The same valuation problems exist if the plaintiff was a buyer who agreed to pay
all or part of the price in something other than dollars.
16 This article is concerned with valuation of what plaintiff saved by virtue of
defendant's total breach. It is rare that valuation problems are presented in cases where
plaintiff's performance was to be a money payment-that is, in cases where plaintiff is a
"buyer." Consequently, the title of the article refers to "seller's damages." But the
theoretical considerations apply whether plaintiff was to pay money and defendant do
something else ("plaintiff is a buyer'') , plaintiff was to do something else and defendant
was to pay money ("plaintiff is a seller'') , or both parties were to do something other
than pay money (contract of exchange) •
17 See I BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 277 (1937).
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Here the legislature is saying that plaintiff-seller's savings should
be valued by reference to the price the rejected goods would fetch
at the nearest commodity exchange,18 or if the goods are not of a
sort sold at such an exchange, by reference to the highest price the
seller could obtain for them by reasonable efforts at reselling
them. 19 This much meaning is locked in the term "market or
current price."
The Restatement of Contracts, section 346 (2) (a), states the
familiar measure of damages where plaintiff is a building contractor and defendant-owner committed a total breach of the contract:
"the entire contract price and compensation for unavoidable
special harm that the defendant had reason to foresee when
the contract was made, less installments already paid and the
cost of completion that the builder can reasonably save by
not completing the work. . . ."
Here plaintiff's savings by exercise of his power to stop further
performance are to be valued by reference to what it should have
cost plaintiff to complete performance.
In Corbin on Contracts20 a formula appears for use in cases
where plaintiff is an employee who is wrongfully discharged before
he substantially completed the service of a particular period
for which a definite wage installment was the agreed equivalent.
The measure is
"the total amount of the unpaid wages that were promised to
him for his service, less the amount that he can earn by making reasonable effort to obtain similar service under another
employer."
Here the employee's savings upon exercise of the power are valued
by reference to the price his services would have fetched had he
used reasonable efforts to resell them: 21 they are valued by reference to the labor market in which he could resell them.
18 E.g., Bogren v. Conn, 224 Iowa 1031, 278 N.W. 289 (1938); Garfield&: Proctor Coal
Co. v. New York, N.H. &: H. Ry., 248 Mass. 502, 143 N.E. 312 (1924); Buyer v. Mercury
Technical Cloth&: Felt Corp., 301 N.Y. 74, 92 N.E.2d 896 (1950); Rees v. R. A. Bowers
Co., 280 Pa. 474, 124 Atl. 653 (1924) •
19 See Churchhill Grain and Seed Co. v. Newton, 88 Conn. 130, 89 Atl. 1121 (1914) ;
Babbitt v. Wides Motor Sales Corp., 17 Misc. 2d 889, 192 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Growers Exch. v. John A. Eck Co., 66 Utah 340, 242 Pac. 391 (1925).
20 5 CORBIN, CONTRACfS § 1095, at 431 (1951).
21 Ibid.

1962]

MEASUREMENT OF SELLER'S DAMAGES

581

In Corbin's discussion of the seller's damages for breach by
a buyer of goods the following passage appears:
"If the seller is a manufacturer or producer of the subject of
the sale, with capacity to produce enough such articles to supply all probable customers, the buyer's rejection does not
make possible a second sale that the seller could not otherwise
have made. Every new customer would have been supplied
even if the buyer had kept the goods and performed his contract. The same is true if the seller, though not himself a
producer of the goods, is an intermediate dealer whose relations with a producer enable him to supply all obtainable customers. In these cases, the buyer's breach does not make
possible a new sale in which the profit lost by the buyer's
breach would be replaced. Every new sale by the seller would
have brought in a new profit. The only 'saving' that the
buyer's breach makes possible in these cases is the 'cost' of
producing or procuring the subject of the sale; the seller is
enabled to make one new sale without incurring the cost of a
second article of the kind. In order to put the seller in as
good a position as that in which performance would have put
him, he must now be awarded the contract price diminished
only by his cost of procurement. Normally, this 'cost of procurement' by an intermediate dealer is the 'wholesale price'
to dealers, not the market value at retail, the difference being
the dealer's profit." 22

The passage reflects the views of several other commentators as
well, 23 and its idea has been followed in a substantial group of
cases involving "expansible" sellers of goods as plaintiff. 24 Indeed,
similar notions appear in many cases where the "expansible" sellerplaintiff sells services, not goods. 25 In all these cases what plaintiff
saved is valued by reference to its cost to plaintiff, rather than the
price at which he could resell it.
Id. § 1100, at 449.
See 1 BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 304 (1937); McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 41
(1935); Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 993 (1956); Note, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1937).
24 E.g., Tedford Auto Co. v. Hom, 113 Ark. 310, 168 S.W. 133 (1914) (by impli·
cation); Willhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (1936);
Cameron v. White, 74 Wis. 425, 43 N.W. 155 (1889) • See also Mossy Motors v. McRedmond, 12 So. 2d 719 (La. 1943) . See pp. 599-604 infra. Annot., 24 A.L.R. 2d 1008 (1952).
25 See Van Winkle v. Satterfield, 58 Ark. 617, 25 S.W. 1113 (1894); Nucholls v.
College of Physicians & Surgeons, 7 Cal. App. 233, 94 Pac. 81 (1907); Sullivan v. McMillan,
37 Fla. 134, 19 So. 340 (1896) ; Mount Pleasant Stable Co. v. Steinberg, 238 Mass. 567, 131
N.E. 295 (1921); Annot., 15 A.L.R. 751 (1921).
2'.!
23

582

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

Thus it would appear that in some situations plaintiff's savings
are to be valued by reference to his costs, and in some situations
they are to be valued by reference to resale price. Moreover, it
appears that even where plaintiff's savings are valued by reference
to their resale price there is a split as to who must prove the resale
price, some cases holding that defendant has the burden of proving
that price,26 while other cases indicate that plaintiff has the burden.27 Thus there are at least three, not two, rules competing in
the cases involving valuation of what plaintiff saved by defendant's
breach. Despite this diversity of basic approaches there is very
little effort made in the reported opinions28 or the commentators'
writings29 to explain the type of case in which each valuation
approach is appropriate.
This article attempts to state some broad rules which the
author thinks should govern the process of valuing what plaintiff
saved by exercise of his power to avoid further performance.30 The
purpose of this article is to demonstrate that there are general
principles and considerations which make possible a set of rules
for valuing what plaintiff saved regardless of the type of contract
involved. The rules stated herein purport to apply whether plaintiff is seller or buyer,31 and whatever the type of commodity being
26 E.g., Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 353 Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 288 (1958);
McMullan v. Dickinson, 60 Minn. 156, 62 N.W. 120 (1895); Manhatten Overseas Co. v.
Camden County Beverage Co., 125 N.J.L. 239, 15 A.2d 217 (1940); Howard v. Daly, 61
N.Y. 362 (1875). See also Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 968 (1951).
21 E.g., Frankel v. Foreman & Clark, 33 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1929); Obrecht v. Crawford,
175 Md. 385, 2 A.2d 1 (1938); McColl v. Wardowski, 280 Mich. 374, 273 N.W. 736 (1937);
Derami, Inc. v. John B. Cabot, Inc., 273 App. Div. 717, 79 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1948). See also
Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1336 (1941) .
28 See 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 276-77 (1937).
29 Among the best of the commentators writing on the variant approaches to valuing
what plaintiff saved thanks to defendant's total breach are 1 BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF
PROPERTY (1937) i 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1004 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 43-49
(1935); Matthews, The Valuation of Property in the Early Common Law, 35 HARv. L.
REv. 15 (1921) .
so Subsequent articles will examine the case law in selected jurisdictions and under
the Uniform Sales Act to determine the extent to which the results of decided cases
correlate with the author's ideas of policy.
31 The conventional categorization of damage rules distinguishes between seller as a
plaintiff and buyer as a plaintiff. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-708; UNIFORM
SALES Ac:r § 64; or the table of contents of any treatise or digest. This often leads to
creation of another category or categories to embrace situations involving breach of a
contract of exchange, such as a typical manufacturer-distributor arrangement. See Nelson
Equip. Co. v. Harner, 191 Ore. 359, 230 P.2d 188 (1951); Annot., 89 A.L.R. 252 (1934) •
. Cf. 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAc:rs § 1025 (1951); 1 SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES § 193 (a) (9th ed. 1912).
Although they rarely recognize the source of their difficulty clearly, courts often have
heavy going in cases involving contracts of exchange because they are used to buyer/seller
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exchanged31a or the character of plaintiff's enterprise,32 or the precise nature of defendant's serious breach.33
The author's "should" is derived in part from what he thinks
are well-established notions that apply across the board in all cases
involving measurement of expectation damages for breach of contract: (1) the goal is expectation-compensation, subject to the
other policies listed below; (2) there is no recovery for items of
loss unforeseeable to defendant at the time of contracting; 34 (3)
there is no recovery for those consequences of breach which plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable self-protective care; 35 (4)
all plaintiff's gains causally related to the breach must be taken
into account in measuring damages, whether or not plaintiff was
obligated by the mitigation notion to incur the risks that were
involved in achieving the particular gain; 36 (5) all items of loss
not proved with sufficient certainty shall be ignored in damage
measurement; 37 (6) all plaintiff's expenditures in reasonable eftype of categorization of plaintiffs. See Frederick v. Hillebrand, 199 Mich. 333, 165
N.W. 810 (1917) (ignoring the problem). Compare Poppenberg v. R. M. Owen & Co.,
84 Misc. 126, 146 N.Y.S. 478 (Sup. Ct. 1914) with A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 App. Div.
533, 300 N.Y. Supp. 226 (1937). See note 16 supra.
31a Conventionally, damage measurement formulae are particularized according to
whether they involve goods, land, services, etc.
32 See, e.g., Renner Co. v. McNeff Bros., 102 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1939) (business requires
advance contracts) ; Patty v. Berryman, 95 Cal. App. 2d 159, 212 P .2d 937 (1949) ("middleman"); Nelson Equip. Co. v. Harner, supra note 31 ("dealer'); Annots., 24 A.L.R. 2d
1008 (1952); 32 A.L.R. 209 (1924) ; 41 A.L.R. 1175 (1926) .
33 For use of this sort of distinction, see Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900); McGrew
v. Ide Estate Inv. Co., 106 Kan. 348, 187 Pac. 887 (1920) ; Forest Prods. Co. v. Dant &:
Russell, Inc., 117 Ore. 637, 244 Pac. 531 (1926); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 215 (1926).
34 The foreseeability doctrine rarely comes into issue in cases where plaintiff is a
seller. The vast bulk of cases in which the doctrine has significance involve efforts to
value "item #2": the difference between what defendant promised to do and what he in
fact did. And "item #2" only presents difficult valuation choices if defendant's performance
is something other than the payment of money-that is, if defendant is a buyer. See
generally Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903); Dally v. Isaacson,
40 Wash. 2d 574, 245 P .2d 200 (1952) ; Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep.
145 (1854); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1007 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 137•141 (1935);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 330 (1932} •
35 See materials cited note 10 supra.
36 See Pacific Odorite Corp. v. Gersh, 94 Cal. App. 2d 174, 210 P.2d 318 (1949);
Griffin v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp., 132 Kan. 843, 297 Pac. 662 (1931); 5 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1041 (1951); McCORllIICK, DAMAGES § 160, at 630 (1935). See also text at
p. 605 infra.
37 Stephany v. Hunt Bros., 62 Cal. App. 638, 217 Pac. 797 (1923); Isbell v. Anderson
Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912); Schoenberg v. Forrest, 253 S.W.2d 331
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1020 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES
§§ 25-32 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 331 (1) (1932) ; Annot., 78 A.L.R. 858 (1932) ;
Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1950).
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forts to avoid the consequences of breach can be recovered,
whether or not the effort ultimately proves successful.38
By the time all these notions are heeded, the range of choice
in the valuation process is much reduced. The question of choice
is then resolved by reference to two notions: (1) the value being
sought is value to the plaintiff; 39 and (2) all remaining choices
should be resolved in the interests of convenient trial administration. The latter notion requires that some attention be given to
matters which are deeply entwined in the choice of valuation approach:40 the allocation of the burden of proof, the types of evidence deemed sufficient to carry the burden, and the availability
of flexible discovery devices.
RULES FOR MEASUREMENT

In fixing the value of plaintiff's unrendered performance, the
initial choice is between valuing the savings as an "entity," or by
reference to the individual components which would have gone
into completing plaintiff's performance. The "entity" approach,
which places emphasis on the possible or actual resale price of
the commodity, rests on the assumption that plaintiff should have
minimized his damages by completing his performance and reselling it to another buyer. The components approach, which places
emphasis on plaintiff's costs, rests on the assumption that the best
way for plaintiff to minimize his damages was to stop work upon
notice of breach. In the great majority of cases mitigation principles will require that the plaintiff stop work upon notice of breach,
so that the typical valuation problem will involve an inquiry into
the value of the components of plaintiff's performance which he
was not required to render.
38 Hartford City Paper Co. v. Enterprise Paper Co., 86 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1949);
National Commodity Corp. v. American Fruit Growers, 45 Del. 169, 70 A.2d 28 (1949);
Berquist v. N.J. Olsen Co., 165 Minn. 406, 206 N.W. 931 (1925); Lake County Pine
Lumber Co. v. Underwood Lumber Co., 140 Ore. 19, 12 P.2d 324 (1932); 5 CoRBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1044 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 42 (1935); REs'fATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 336 (2) (1932) .
39 See Continental Copper & Steel Industries v. Bloom, 139 Conn. 700, 96 A.2d 758
(1953); Moline Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 N.W. 338
(1937) . Cf. Cody v. American Educational Co., 131 Ill. App. 240 (1907) . See also 1
BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 271 (1937); McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 44, at 168
(1935) ; 1 SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES § 251 (9th ed. 1912) ; 3 WII.LISTON, CONTRACTS § 1343
(1931) • Cf. REs'fATEMENT, TORTS § 911 (1939) •
40 See discussion at pages 588-92 infra.
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PLAINTIFF'S SAVINGS VALUED INDIVIDUALLY

A. Identification of Components
Identification of the components which were to have gone
into plaintiff's performance during the time interval after defendant's total breach necessitates inquiry into plaintiff's state of affairs
at the moment of total breach.41 What he had on hand then and
how he planned to assemble component parts of his performance
not yet on hand are essential matters for accurate measurement.
Five types of components of his as yet unrendered performance
can be distinguished as of that moment in time: (1) overhead;
(2) variable costs yet to be incurred; (3) real property on hand;
(4) personal property on hand; and (5) plaintiff's non-delegable
services yet to be rendered. Distinctions must be drawn among
these categories because each should have its own appropriate valuation rules.
"Overhead" in this context embraces all economic items that
share two characteristics: (1) had plaintiff not exercised his power
to stop work they would have been brought to bear, directly or
indirectly, in the task of completing plaintiff's promised performance; (2) the item in question, whether or not plaintiff had it on
hand at the moment he learned of breach, would have been used
by plaintiff not only in completing his performance of this contract, but also in the performance of others. "Overhead," as used
here, includes such items as the plaintiff's insurance protection,
his goodwill, the work time of his employees, his productive real
property whether owned or leased, his machinery-in short, all
assets whose cost of acquisition is regarded as fixed, not variable.
It makes no difference whether an overhead item was on hand or
yet to be acquired, at the moment of breach notice.
"Variable costs yet to be incurred" differ from "overhead" in
two obvious ways: (1) we now concentrate on items not yet on
hand nor under contract to plaintiff at the moment of breach notice, whereas the "overhead" category was indifferent to the mo41 The moment of notice of breach-in repudiation cases-or tbe moment when
plaintiff elects to terminate-in otber total breach cases-is tbe critical moment for determining what is to be measured. 'When that question has been resolved, and the court
seeks to value property on hand by reference to its resale price, a separate and distinct
problem of timing arises: as of what date shall resale value be measured? Resolution of tbe
latter question is beyond the scope of tbe present article. See, e.g., McCORMICK, DAMAGES
§ 48 (1935) ; Note, 37 MINN. L. REV. 215 (1953).

586

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

ment when plaintiff acquired the item in question; (2) we now
concentrate exclusively on costs which are variable, not fixed. Only
those items which are to be used only on the balance of the plaintiff-defendant contract come into this category. Obviously, difficulty will be encountered in close cases in tracing the borderline between overhead and variable costs yet to be incurred.42
There will, of necessity, be similar difficulty in close cases in distinguishing variable costs yet to be incurred from real or personal
property on hand. 43
"Real property on hand" includes all interests in real property
which meet two tests: (1) had plaintiff completed his performance with defendant he would have transferred this interest in the
real property; and (2) at the time of breach notice plaintiff owned
this interest in the real property. It makes no difference for present purposes whether the interest in question was a fee or some
lesser estate in land or some incorporeal hereditament. The critical things are that plaintiff saved the interest thanks to breach and
he had this interest on hand at the time of breach notice.
The line between real property on hand and variable costs yet
to be incurred may become gray in some cases.44 For example, if
plaintiff was to convey land in fee- to defendant, and at the time
of breach plaintiff owned it subject to a mortgage which was in
default, probably plaintiff should be deemed to have the real property on hand. .But if his only interest in the land at the moment
of breach notice was his right to redeem it from the purchaser who
bought it at the foreclosure sale, and plaintiff contracted to deliver the land in fee, plaintiff probably should be regarded as having saved the variable cost yet to be incurred of redeeming the
land from the foreclosure sale purchaser.45 Perhaps the question
should turn on whether it is likely that a reasonable man in plain42 E.g., Rantoul Co. v. Claremont Paper Co., 196 Fed. 305 (1st Cir. 1912) ; Detroit
Fireproofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916) ; Jessup &: Moore
Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147 Atl. 519 (1929).
43 E.g., Dolly Parker Motors v. Stinson, 220 Ark. 28, 245 S.W.2d 820 (1952); Nestler v.
Pure Silk Hosiery Mills, 242 Ill. App. 151 (1926) ; Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp.,
222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923); Hayes v. Durham, 194 App. Div. 848, 185 N.Y. Supp.
691 (1921).
44 E.g., Raycraft v. Northville-Six Mile Co., 358 Mich. 466, 100 N.W.2d 223 (1960);
Roper v. Milbourn, 98 Neb. 466, 153 N.W. 557 (1915); McDaniel v. Daves, 139 Va. 178,
123 S.E. 663 (1924) •
45 Cf. Shurtleff v. Marcus Land & Inv. Co., 59 Cal. App. 520, 211 Pac. 244 (1922) •
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tiff's shoes, upon notice of defendant's breach, would exercise the
right to redeem anyway.
"Personal property on hand" embraces both goods and choses
in action. Of course in cases where plaintiff is a bailor, not seller,
it is the use of the property for the length of time fixed in the contract which is the item to be valued. A distinction is drawn between personal property on hand and real property on hand solely
because different rules of valuation govern them. The difference
in these valuation rules stems from the fact that in goods cases
plaintiff's alternative remedies to the damage remedy are different
from those in the realty cases. This will be elaborated subsequently. 46
"Non-delegable services yet to be rendered" embraces the
saved "time" of persons who were to perform all or part of plaintiff's side of the bargain and whose identity is an essential part of
plaintiff's promised performance. If plaintiff is an individual, and
his services were so "personal" that delegation of them to another
without defendant's consent would have justified defendant's
refusal to perform further, 47 plaintiff's services are non-delegable.
If plaintiff is a partnership, corporation, unincorporated association or the like, and the contract required all or part of plaintiff's
performance being rendered by a specific person or persons,48 the
services of such persons are "non-delegable" as the term is here
used.
These five categories should embrace all items that would have
gone into the process of completion of plaintiff's promised performance. In some cases all items saved will fall into a single
category; 49 in other cases items will fall into more than one category.50 In any event categorization must precede application of
the rules of valuation.
See text at pp. 595-97 infra.
New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 226 Mass. 246, 115 N.E. 315 (1917); Corson
v. Lewis, 77 Neb. 446, 109 N.W. 735 (1906); Folquet v. Woodburn Pub. Schools, 146 Ore.
339, 29 P.2d 554 (1934); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 865 (1951).
48 See Wetherell Bros. v. United States Steel Co., 200 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1952); Wooster
v. Crane&: Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 22, 66 Atl. 1093 (1907); Johnson v. Vickers, 139 Wis. 145, 120
N.W. 837 (1909) .
40 E.g., St. John v. Richard, 272 Mich. 670, 262 N.W. 437 (1935) (real property on
hand); Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W. 252 (1924) (personal property on
hand) ; Gallino v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 N.W. 222 (1922) (non-delegable personal
services) ; Burrel v. New York &: Saginaw Solar Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865) (variable
costs).
50 Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Foster Boat Co., 141 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1944) ;
46
47
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Overhead Saved
Valuation Problems

Were there neither problems of proof nor of accounting the
process of valuing plaintiff's saved overhead might exhibit the
following sequence: (1) listing of all non-variable items that
would go into completion of plaintiff's performance, directly or
indirectly; (2) elimination by the court of those items on the list
that contribute only indirectly, since breach does not "release"
them for other profitable re-employment by plaintiff; (3) elimination of those items remaining which plaintiff after breach neither re-employed nor was obligated by mitigation to re-employ;
(4) determination of the percentage of the remaining items on
the list that should be allocated to the performance of the balance
of plaintiff's contract with defendant; (5) valuation of each of
these remaining items at cost to plaintiff and multiplication of the
cost of each by the percentage of it that should be allocated to the
balance of this contract; (6) totaling the figures thus determined
for each remaining item to get the value to plaintiff of the overhead saved.

2. Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Of course the process just described bears little resemblance to
reality, where there are problems of proofli1 and of accounting.52
Step number three above, which requires a determination of
whether the plaintiff either did or should have re-employed the
overhead items released by breach, is almost always incapable of
proof. Whichever party has the burden of proof usually is doomed
to fail to carry it on this issue. ("Burden of proof" is used here in
the sense of the burden of going forward.) Accordingly, the court
must either assume (a) that all released assets were or should have
been re-employed by plaintiff or (b) that no released assets were
or should have been thus re-employed. The latter assumption
McConnell v. Corona City Water Co., 149 Cal. 60, 85 Pac. 929 (1906); Capital Paper
Box, Inc. v. Belding Hosiery Mills, Inc., 350 Ill. App. 68, 111 N.E.2d 858 (1953); Callender
v. Myers Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930).
51 See McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 29 (1935) ; Note, 28 CoLUM. L. REv. 76 (1928) ; Note,
46 HARV. L. REv. 696 (1933); Note, 17 MINN. L. REV. 194 (1932).
112 See Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 992 (1956).
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means, m effect, that the court never treats plaintiff as having
saved any overhead. 03
If the court engages in the latter assumption it creates the peril
that in some cases-those in which plaintiff does in fact re-employ
his overhead items-plaintiff will be overcompensated. The opposite assumption creates a peril that in cases where plaintiff does not
and cannot re-employ released overhead items he will be undercompensated. Neither prospect is happy, and the amount at stake
can be large if a large part of plaintiff's costs are fixed.
The best course is to create a rebuttable presumption, either
that all overhead items have been re-employed, or, on the contrary, that none have been re-employed. The latter presumption
would have the virtue of simplifying trial in those cases where no
effort at rebuttal is made.
In choosing between the two possible presumptions, the court
faces a conflict of policy goals. Anything which tends toward
under-compensation has the virtue of helping to split the loss
between the parties. If the court assumes there is social utility
in splitting the loss54-so that each party has less loss to absorb
and/ or distribute-this argues for presuming that all overhead
items have been re-employed.
But if the court assumes there is social utility in deterring
future breaches of this sort55 and in encouraging reliance upon
promises of this sort,56 then undercompensation is an evil. The
court which embraces these as policy goals of contract law will find
its damage law already too undercompensatory, thanks to the "certainty" requirement, 57 the non-recovery of expenses of litigation,58
and the notion that recovery is limited to harm to plaintiff's eco53 Compare McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 165, at 644 (1935) with Note, 78 U. PA. L. REv.
563 (1930).
M See SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES 38 (1st ed. 1847) ; On the Measure of Damages Ex Contractu,
3 U. PA. L. REv. 513 (1855); Comment, Loss Splitting in Contract Litigation, 18 U. CHI.
L. REv. 153 (1950) .
56 See KEssLER & SHARP, CASES ON CoNTRACTS 555 (1953); Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61 (1936); Comment, 57 YALE L.J.
1360, 1366 (1948) ; cf. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 738 (1931) •
56 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 55, at 72; Llewellyn, supra note 55, at 725 n.47.
57 See text at note 37 supra.
58 See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 1037 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 71 (1935); REs:rATElllENT, CONTRACTS§ 334 (1932); Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940); Note, 21 VA. L. REv.
920 (1935).
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nomic interests. 511 Such a court should presume that no overhead
items have been re-employed.
To treat loss-splitting between plaintiff and defendant as a
social goal of contract law seems dubious inasmuch as the
parties usually regard the contract as a device for shifting the risk
of loss. 60 In situations in which the parties never contemplated the
risk of this kind of loss at the time they contracted, the contract, of
course, is not intended by them as a device for shifting the loss.
In such cases, non-consensual allocation of the loss is necessary,
and the judges are well-advised to split such losses between the
parties to minimize the peril that either of them will be destroyed
by the entire loss.61 The doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale62 performs this function in contract litigation, much as the doctrine of
proximate cause performs it in tort litigation.63 But where the risk
of this kind of loss was contemplated at the time of contracting and
the economic function of the contract was to shift this risk from
plaintiff to defendant, the courts shoulq not foster doctrines which
prevent a substantial part of the risk from being thus shifted.
Courts which nevertheless choose to presume that all plaintiff's
released overhead items were or should have been re-employed on
other contracts must then face the problems involved in measuring
saved overhead. In view of the manifold problems of proof and
accounting that such cases can present, little in the way of "rules"
seems desirable other than a requirement that the court handle
each case ad hoc, with due appreciation of (a) the particular kinds
of data which are available in each case and (b) the amount of
money a~ stake. Obviously the court should permit some minor
inaccuracy in theory if it permits counsel to make use of existing
data, rather than requiring theoretical accuracy to the point where
the only available evidence is inadmissible. Equally obvious is the
idea that more precision should be demanded when larger sums
are at stake.
If saved overhead is to be measured, the burden of proving
511 See materials cited note 2 supra.
60 LLEWELLYN, CASES ON SALES 1 (1930).
61 See authorities cited note 55 supra.
62 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) .
63 See generally 1 BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 287 (1937); GREEN, JUDGE AND
JURY, ch. 2 (1930) ; GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, ch. 6 (1927) ; McCORMICK,
DAMAGES § 32 (1935); Miller, Damages, Responsibility, and Loss of Profits, 17 MARQ. L.

REv. 3 (1932) .
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the items in question and the amount of each item should be placed
on defendant, at least if the state has broad discovery procedures
which defendant can use to obtain information in plaintiff's control.64 It is true that even with the aid of discovery devices defendant will have poorer access to the data than plaintiff, and it is
also true that in cases where small sums are involved discovery may
not be feasible. But admitting these disadvantages it is still better
to saddle defendant with the burden of proof than to place it on
plaintiff, since plaintiff has no incentive to prove his items of saved
overhead or to prove any item to be large. It is in his interest
that there be fewer items of overhead saved and that each item be
as small as possible. 65 If defendant has the burden of proof the
court can force defendant to carry the burden by (a) assuming
no items of overhead to exist except those proved by defendant;
and (b) assuming no item is larger than defendant proves it to be.
If plaintiff has the burden the court cannot compel it to be carried
by such assumptions when the burden falls; plaintiff would like
nothing better than to see the burden fall in that event.
In order to compel plaintiff to carry the burden, it would be
necessary to give him this all-or-nothing proposition: if the court
concludes that plaintiff failed to prove all items of overhead or
that he understated any particular item of overhead he will be
deemed to have failed to carry the burden of proof on the whole
subject of damages.il6 His penalty is that he is not permitted to
recover more than nominal damages.il7 The practical difficulties
with this arrangement are enormous. For one thing, the court is
hardly in a position to know whether plaintiff's evidence of saved
overhead is incomplete. 68 Moreover, plaintiff's failure to prove a
64 In a state where very limited discovery is available the author can see little reason
for preferring one resolution of the burden of proof over the other. Either way the court
allocates the burden there is some peril of unfairness here. Cf. Bova v. Roanoke Oil Co.,
180 Va. 332, 23 S.E.2d 347 (1942) . But see Capital Paper Box, Inc. v. Belding Hosiery
Mills, Inc., 350 Ill. App. 68, 111 N.E.2d 858 (1953).
611 Cf. Demirjian v. Kurtis, 353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W .2d 841 (1958); Breding v. Champlain Marine & Realty Co., 106 Vt. 288, 172 Atl. 625 (1934); Quist v. Zerr, 12 Wash. 2d
21, 120 P.2d 539 (1941).
66 E.g., C. L. Percival Co. v. Sea, 207 Iowa 245, 222 N.W. 886 (1929); Callender v.
Myers Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930) .
67 See International Textbook Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908);
Crichfield-Loeffler, Inc. v. Taverna, 4 N.J. Misc. 310, 132 Atl. 494 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Buyer
v. Mercury Technical Cloth & Felt Corp., 301 N.Y. 74, 92 N.E.2d 896 (1950) .
68 E.g., Nesler v. Pure Silk Hosiery Mills, 242 Ill. App. 151 (1926); Nurmi v. Beardsley,
284 Mich. 165, 278 N.W. 805 (1938); Nelson Equip. Co. v. Harner, 191 Ore. 359, 230
P.2d 188 (1951).
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single item or part of an item may not be due to such gross delinquency on his part that he should be visited by so severe a penalty.
His failure may come from inability to locate evidence of a kind
that can satisfy the certainty requirement69 or his erroneous theory
as to the approach to valuation which would be taken. 70 A court
must indeed be fearful of the risk of possible overcompensation if
it prefers to put the burden of proving saved overhead on plaintiff
rather than defendant, especially where defendant has discovery
devices available to help him carry the burden.

C.

Variable Costs Yet To Be Incurred

These items should be valued at the sum plaintiff would have
paid for them had he incurred these costs. Valuation requires
proof of (a) which cost-items would have been purchased; and (b)
the actual disbursement which would have been made for each
item. Here, as in the previous section involving overhead, allocation of the burden of proof requires choice between the party with
superior access to the evidence and the party who has the motive
to bring the evidence forward. For all the reasons given in the
prior section the burden of proof should be placed on the defendant, at least in a state where defendant has adequate discovery
tools at hand.

D.

Real Property on Hand

I.

Valuation Problems

The court usually need not choose between valuing the realty
by replacement cost or valuing it by resale price: replacement and
resale normally would take place in the same market.
If the land was sold by plaintiff after breach and before trial,
and if that sale was made under conditions that conform to plaintiff's obligation to mitigate by resale71 (i.e., it was not a sacrifice
69 Cf. Busam Motor Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F. Supp. 790, 796 (S.D. Ohio
1949); O'Hare v. Peacock Dairies, Inc., 26 Cal. App. 2d 345, 79 P.2d 433 (1938); Western
Hatcheries v. Byrd, 218 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
70 See Transit Bus Sales v. Kalamazoo Coaches, 145 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1944); Crawford v. Cicotte, 186 Mich. 269, 152 N.W. 1065 (1916) ; Maxwell v. Schaefer, 381 Pa. 13, 112
A.2d 69 (1955) •
71 See McBrayer v. Cohen, 92 Ky. 479, 18 S.W. 123 (1892); Griswold v. Sabin, 51
N.H. 167 (1871); Kempner v. Heidenheimer, 65 Tex. 587 (1886).
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sale), the price received upon resale should fix the value to plaintiff of the saved realty.72
Absent such an actual proper resale before trial, however, the
court must seek to measure the potential resale price of the realty
saved. Two questions are involved: (I) whether or not any willing buyer could be found for the realty in question; and (2) if
the first question is answered affirmatively, the price such a willing
buyer would pay. Because land is a slow-moving commodity, with
few buyers bidding on any particular tract on any particular day,
it is most difficult to prove with certainty that a willing buyer
could have been found for a particular tract unless the court
presumes that every tract of land can be sold, given enough time
for the seller to turn up a buyer. This presumption corresponds to
reality better than would a contrary presumption, and should be
indulged by the courts.
There remains the question of what price a willing buyer
would pay for the tract in question when he finally was found.
Here the only feasible solution is to permit expert testimony based
upon familiarity with the tract in question and the "market." In
this context "market" means the mass of actual sales, and of offers
made by buyers of other comparable tracts at comparable dates in
a comparable geographic area. Of course the extrapolation from
these other bids and sales grows more accurate as the other bids
and sales grow more similar to the sale as to which the expert is
giving his opinion.

2. Burden of Proof
The burden of proving the resale value of the realty saved
should be placed on plaintiff. In cases where there has been a resale before trial which conforms to mitigation standards plaintiff
has the best access to this evidence.73 In cases where the proof
must be by expert testimony of potential, not actual, resale value
the parties have equal access to the evidence. But the defendant is
placed under greater hardship than the plaintiff if he is given the
72 E.g., Bouchard v. Orange, 177 Cal. App. 2d 521, 2 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1960); Gardner
v. Armstrong, 111 Mo. 535 (1862) ; Stephenson v. Butts, 187 Pa. Super. 55, 142 A,2d 319
(1958).
73 If plaintiff proves a fair resale he breaks even on the entire transaction. If he
suppresses the fact of resale in order to prove a lower potential resale value he runs the
risk the court will find a higher potential resale value.
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burden of proof: if plaintiff cannot or does not choose to adduce
evidence of potential value (and run the risk of a jury finding of
high resale value) he can seek his alternative expectation remedies74-specific performance,75 non-judicial foreclosure of the seller's lien76 or a suit for the whole price.77 But if defendant is saddled with the burden of proof he has no alternatives.
Where there is an actual proper resale before trial plaintiff
should be permitted to recover as incidental damages the extra
expenses entailed in the process of resale. Such expenses might
include costs of advertising, paying broker's commission, taxes
during the interval between the originally scheduled closing and
the closing with the repurchaser, maintenance expenses during
that interval, insurance during that interval, assessments during
that interval, etc. Plaintiff should have the burden of proving both
the size and the existence of these items since he has superior access
to the evidence and the motive to bring it forth.
Where there has been no actual resale, but the kind of resale
required by mitigation would entail similar kinds of expenditure,
plaintiff again should have the burden of proof. But as a practical
matter plaintiff will rarely be able to prove with certainty the size
or existence of these items, since the hypothetical resale in question
is the somewhat hazy extrapolation of experts who are basing their
opinion on fragmentary market data and some assumptions which
are contrary to fact: that there is a willing buyer present on the date
as of which the tract is to be valued.78
74 Plaintiff also has the alternative (non-expectation) remedies of restitution and
reliance damages.
75 See Morgan v. Eaton, 59 Fla. 562, 52 So. 305 (1910) ; Staples v. Mullen, 196 Mass.
132, 81 N.E. 877 (1907); Abbott v. Moldestad, 74 Minn. 293, 77 N.W. 227 (1898); 3
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 11.68 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1139
(1951); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1443 (1931).
76 See Cams v. Sexsmith, 193 Iowa 1080, 188 N.W. 657 (1922); Barnard v. Huff, 252
Mich. 258, 233 N.W. 213 (1930); Vance v. Blakeley, 62 Ore. 326, 123 Pac. 390 (1912);
3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.73 (Casner ed. 1952).
77 See McCurry v. Pitner, 159 Ga. 807, 126 S.E. 781 (1925); Prichard v. Mulhall, 140
Iowa 1, 118 N.W. 43 (1908); Bohlen v. Black, 237 Pa. 399, 85 Atl. 470 (1912); 3 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.77 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1099 (1951); 3
SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES § 1024 (9th ed. 1912) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1399 (1931).
78 Cf. Thomthwaite v. Thomas, 71 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1954); Linde v. Ellis, 224 Ky. 649,
6 S.W.2d 1089 (1928); Hubbard v. Epworth, 69 Mich. 92, 36 N.W. 801 (1888); Levy v.
315 W. 79th St. Corp., 222 App. Div. 9, 225 N.Y. Supp. 218 (1927).
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E. Personal Property on Hand 19
I. Valuation Problems in General
For the most part valuation of personal property on hand is
conducted in the same fashion as valuation of realty on hand. It is
the resale value of the personalty which the court seeks,80 and if there
was no actual resale before trial which meets mitigation standards,
it is the potential resale price of the personalty saved which is the
ultimate fact sought. As with realty two questions must be answered: (1) could a willing buyer have been found, and (2) if he
could have been found, what would he have been willing to pay?
The presumption-appropriate in realty cases-that a willing
buyer always can be found, is not appropriate in personalty cases.
In real property cases potential resale value properly is proved by
expert testimony as to what a hypothetical willing buyer would pay
a hypothetical willing seller, for reasons already indicated. In cases
involving goods or choses there is often available to the diligent
plaintiff more reliable evidence of potential resale value-reports
of prices actually paid or offers actually made by other buyers and
sellers of this product. To encourage resort to such better evidence
courts should reject efforts by the party with the burden of proof
to prove potential resale value of goods and choses by reference to
expert guesses as to the behavior of hypothetical willing buyers and
sellers. Plaintiff, who will have the burden of proof,81 if he would
prove potential resale value at all, should be required to offer
evidence of actual sales or offers of a sort comparable to his potential resale--comparable in subject-matter, date, and locale. 82
79 The problems of double counting and impairment of total volume by resale of
the plaintiff's saved performance are discussed in this section because they most frequently
arise in cases where plaintiff is a seller of goods. However, they can arise in connection
with other saved commodities, and in that event should be treated in a fashion analogous
to that sketched here.
80 There is often some confusion about this in the cases. E.g., H. W. Faulkner & Co.
v. Centralia Bottling Works, 234 Ill. App. 9 (1924); Hausman v. Buchman, 189 App. Div.
597, 179 N.Y. Supp. 26 (1919); Breding v. Champlain Marine & Realty Co., 106 Vt. 288,
172 Atl. 625 (1934). But many cases which purport to be valuing the saved goods on
hand at replacement cost or cost of acquisition seem to be giving a false rationale for a
result which can better be justified on the more complex grounds suggested at pp. 599-604
infra.
81 See discussion at p. 599 infra.
82 The line between cases where expert testimony as to willing buyers is and is not
proper is best drawn at the familiar point where realty is separated from personalty.
This is not because all realty is non-fungible and slow-moving and all personalty is the
opposite, but because the correlation between these traits and these categories is sufficiently
high that it seems better to use well-marked categories than to create new ones.
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Since such proof is not always feasible for all kinds of goods and
choses, there must be some route open for the plaintiff dealing in a
commodity not sold at organized exchanges. Rather than permit
such a plaintiff to resort to the loose real property valuation technique,83 the courts should reject his efforts to recover expectation
damages, and require that he use some other remedy calculated to
vindicate his expectation interest.
The plaintiff's alternatives include (1) a suit at law for the
price, with defendant getting title to the undelivered goods or
choses which plaintiff holds as bailee; 84 (2) an informal foreclosure of plaintiff's lien on the undelivered goods or choses by
non-judicial resale under specified conditions with deficiency
judgment; 85 (3) a suit for expectation damages, with plaintiff's
savings valued by reference to the cost of replacing the goods in
question.86
All three alternatives have disadvantages which limit their use.
The availability of the price remedy hinges on whether the saved
personalty is goods or choses, whether or not title has passed, and
whether the problem is governed by common law, Uniform Sales
Act, or the Uniform Commercial Code. If choses are involved, the
price remedy will be uniformly available if title has passed, 87 but
in some states it is not available if title has not passed. 88 If goods
are involved and the Uniform Commercial Code is in effect, the
price remedy is rarely available,89 even if title has passed.90 If
83 The plaintiff should not be permitted to sue for damages in a realty case if an
alternative expectation remedy is available to him, such as specific performance, price, or
foreclosure. He should not be encouraged to use a damage remedy which entails a speculative type of proof of value. However, a rule forcing plaintiff to shun his legal remedy
while there is an available equitable one runs directly contrary to the pro-jury maxims
which have guided the accommodation of legal and equitable remedies. So giving jury
trial its due, the plaintiff in realty cases cannot be deprived of his damage remedy except
where he has a price remedy. In such cases plaintiff normally uses the price remedy.
84 See Home Pattern Co. v. W.W. Mertz Co., 86 Conn. 494, 86 Atl. 19 (1913); Corwin
v. Grays Harbor Washingtonian, Inc., 151 Wash. 585, 276 Pac. 902 (1929); Renne v. Volk,
188 Wis. 508, 205 N.W. 385 (1926).
85 See Howse v. Crumb, 143 Colo. 90, 352 P.2d 285 (1960) ; Urbansky v. Kutinsky, 86
Conn. 22, 84 Atl. 317 (1912); Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc. v. Larsen, 362 P.2d 384 (Idaho
1961); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-706; UNIFORM SALES ACT§ 60; Annots., 119 A.L.R.
1141 (1939), 44 A.L.R. 296 (1926).
86 See Brunswick.-Balke-Collender Co. v. Wisconsin Mat Co., 24 F.2d 78 (7th Cir.
1928); Breding v. Champlain Marine&: Realty Co., 106 Vt. 288, 172 Atl. 625 (1934); Popp
v. Yuenger, 229 Wis. 189, 282 N.W. 55 (1938).
87 WILLISTON, SALES § 561 (1924) •
88 See DAWSON &: HARVEY, CAsES ON CONTRACTS 218 (1959) •
89 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-709.
90 The Code does not speak of "title," but of the "risk of loss." Even after the "risk
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goods are involved and the Uniform Sales Act governs, the price
remedy is available if title has passed,91 and in a limited class of
cases where title has not passed.92
The informal foreclosure procedure is available only to the
limited extent permitted by statute,93 and presents problems of
hindsight policing of the sale which plaintiff made.94 Unless the
jury can be kept out of this process plaintiff faces substantial risks
when he resells and hopes it will later meet official approval.
The resort to a damage remedy with plaintiff's savings valued by
his cost of replacing the goods has the disadvantage of measuring
value to him by reference to behavior (replacement) which is not
plausible for one in his position. It is essentially an arbitrary
method of valuation in this context.
It is dubious whether valuing plaintiff's saved goods on hand at
replacement cost is any improvement over valuing them by what
an expert says a willing buyer would pay. If replacement cost
valuation is the only available alternative to expert guessing at
resale value, perhaps the trial court should have discretion to
permit use of expert testimony of resale value in a goods case. But
where a price or informal foreclosure remedy was available to
plaintiff and he failed to use it, the court should not accept the real
property type of proof.
The handling of incidental damages (where plaintiff actually
resold properly before trial) or the extra expenses that would have
been incurred in proper mitigation by resale (where plaintiff did
not resell properly before trial) should be the same in personalty
and realty cases with this exception: in personalty cases it should be
possible more often for plaintiff to prove with certainty the extra
expenses that would have attended proper resale.
A peril of double counting arises, however, when plaintiff's
efforts at mitigation prove successful, and they take the form of
of loss" has passed to the buyer, seller has no price remedy unless the goods were ac•
cepted, or they were lost or damaged shortly after the risk passed, or they were identified
to the contract and cannot be resold feasibly. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-709 (1) •
UNIFORM SALES Acr § 63 (1) •
UNIFORM SALES Acr § 63 (3) •
93 UNIFORM SALES Acr § 60; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-706.
94 Frankel v. Foreman&: Clark, 33 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1929); Lund v. Lachman, 29 Cal.
App. 31, 154 Pac. 295 (1915); Zinsmeister v. Rock Island Canning Co., 145 Ky. 25, 139
S.W. 1068 (1911); Rees v. R. A. Bowers Co., 280 Pa. 474, 124 Atl. 653 (1924) .
91
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expenditure to accomplish a resale of the goods.95 For example, a
plaintiff may be a seller of goods who, upon defendant-buyer's
repudiation, incurs advertising expense in a successful effort to
locate a new buyer for the goods. The advertising expense is
properly included as an item of incidental damage unless it has
already been taken into account in measuring accurately plaintiff's
savings. This can occur if the value of what plaintiff saved was
computed by deducting from the gross resale price of the goods
the cost to plaintiff of advertising them.
Another situation presenting the peril is this: in a situation
similar to that just described, plaintiff avoids the expense he otherwise would have incurred in shipping the goods from plaintiff's
plant in Chicago to defendant's plant in Detroit. But his resale
contract obligates him to deliver the goods to the resale purchaser
in San Francisco. Plaintiff cannot recover as an item of incidental
damage the whole cost of shipping the goods from their location
at breach (Chicago) to the place of resale (San Francisco) ; account
must be taken of the shipping costs saved-from Chicago to
Detroit. The amount of damages properly allowed is the difference between freight from Chicago to San Francisco and the
freight from Chicago to Detroit.96
Where plaintiff is obligated to mitigate by resale, but he does
not do so before trial, his damages are calculated as if he had. In
computing the value to him of what he saved the court should take
into account the extra expenses that would have been involved in
the process of mitigation. For example, if plaintiff should have
mitigated in the example above by reselling in San Francisco and
he utterly failed to mitigate, the value to him of what he saved is
the price the goods would have brought in San Francisco, reduced
by the difference between freight to San Francisco and freight to
Detroit.
The extra freight involved in resale in San Francisco should be
taken into account now not because it is an item of incidental
95 See Willhelm Lubrication v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (1936); Lake
County Pine Lumber Co. v. Underwood Lumber Co., 140 Ore. 19, 12 P.2d 324 (1932);
Margaret Mill v. Aycock Hosiery Mills, 20 Tenn. App. 533, 101 S.W.2d 154 (1936) ; 5
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1036 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 142, at 585 (1935) ; RESTATE•
MENT, CONTRACTS § 333, comment f (1932) .
96 Cf. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243 (1924); Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77
Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 864 (1889) ; Reading Co. v. Aronsky, 19 Leh. County L.J. 320 (Pa,
Ct. C.P. 1941) •
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damages; it is not; but because it is relevant if plaintiff's opportunity to achieve a savings is to be measured accurately. Of course,
if the item in question is not proved with certainty the court must
disregard it,97 but it is possible to prove the item although it was
not in fact incurred before trial. In other words, where such an
extra expense is actually incurred, there are two reasons for taking
it into account-because it bears on what plaintiff saved, and
because it is an item of incidental damage-and the court must
exercise care to avoid double counting. Where such extra expense
is not actually incurred, there is only one reason for taking it into
account-to measure accurately what the plaintiff should have
saved-and the court must exercise care lest it fallaciously ignore
the item.98
2. Burden of Proof in General
There remains the question of which party should have the
burden of proving the potential resale value of the goods by
reference to actual comparable sales. Since plaintiff has the choice
of remedies-price, foreclosure, damages-there is some peril in
giving defendant the burden of proving values. Plaintiff, where
proof of value is hard to produce, would always elect the damage
remedy if defendant had the burden of proof; if defendant failed
to carry the burden plaintiff would retain the goods and recover
the unpaid balance of the price without deducting anything to
reflect the value of the goods retained. It is better to solve the
problem by placing the burden of proof on plaintiff.
3.

Problems of Lost Volume

a. When does resale impair volume'! Corbin's discussion of
the expansible seller as plaintiff,99 which was quoted earlier,
identifies a familiar problem in the cases involving saved personalty: one of the extra expenses of actual or potential mitigation
by resale in some cases is an impairment of plaintiff's total volume
of sales. If plaintiff, upon defendant's rejection of the goods,
should resell them to the first customer who comes along after the
breach, and plaintiff othenvise would have sold other goods to
07 E.g., Demari, Inc. v. John B. Cabot, Inc., 273 App. Div. 717, 98 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1948);
Columbia Produce Co. v. Tiskowitz, 134 Pa. Super. 145, 3 A.2d 990 (1938) .
98 Cf. McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 182, at 696 (1935) •
90 See text at note 23 supra.
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that customer, the resale has "cost" plaintiff the sale of those other
goods. This invisible cost will be present whether the contract
with defendant called for the sale of specified personalty or
personalty that was only generally described in the contract. And
it will be present whether or not plaintiff has special channels open
with his supplier.
Three conditions, however, must be met before the phenomenon occurs. First, at the time of the breach, plaintiff must have
had the intention of maximizing his sales volume. If he lacked
such intent the resale did not cause a reduction of his total volume
since he never intended to sell other goods to the customer who,
because of defendant's breach and the consequent resale, took the
goods defendant rejected. Whether or not plaintiff had such an
intent normally can be ascertained by proof of whether plaintiff
was a commercial seller of the personalty in question. If he was a
commercial seller, and if the sale was in the ordinary course of
business, plaintiff probably intended to maximize his volume.
Otherwise, it is safe to presume that he did not intend to maximize
his volume.
The second condition concerns plaintiff's physical capacity to
perform both his original contract with defendant and another,
similar contract with the first customer who comes along after
defendant's breach. If plaintiff lacked this physical ability (and
could not have performed with the other customer but for the
breach), his failure to sell additional goods to the first customer
who came along after breach was not caused by the breach and
resale. 100 In resolving this question plaintiff's arrangements with
his supplier of goods should be scrutinized as should all his
commercial arrangements which might bear on this ultimate
question. 101
The last of the three conditions goes to the question whether
plaintiff should have recaptured (or did recapture) any lost
volume by some adjustment in his manner of doing business which
would have increased the demand for his product. For if plaintiff
either did or should have recaptured his lost volume in this
100 See Hinckley v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co., 121 U.S. 264 (1887); Petrie v. Lane,
67 Mich. 454, 35 N.W. 70 (1887); Locks v. Wade, 36 N.J. Super. 128, 114 A.2d 875 (1955);
R.EsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 336, comment c (1932); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 1008 (1952) .
101 But see ·waters, The Concept of Market in the Sale of Goods, 36 CAN. B. REv. 360
(1958).
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fashion the resale cannot be regarded as having cost plaintiff
the value of the lost volume; it should be regarded as having cost
plaintiff whatever it would take to adjust his manner of doing
business in a way that recaptures the lost volume. These readjustments to recapture lost volume might take the form of selling
at a lower price, selling on terms more favorable to the buyer,
extending credit to poorer risks, or increasing plaintiff's total
promotional expenditure.
Where the change in plaintiff's way of doing business would
seriously inconvenience him, or might seriously inconvenience
him, mitigation does not require the change. Courts do not, and
should not, listen to defendant's suggestions as to possible changes
plaintiff could have made in his standard business procedures
unless the proposed change is simple enough that the court feels
some confidence in its ability to judge whether or not it would
entail subtle, but real, hardship on plaintiff. Thus it should be
the rare case where a court seriously entertains the question of
whether plaintiff should have changed his way of doing business
in other aspects than lowering his price or increasing his promotional efforts. Even these changes may entail subtle, but real,
drawbacks that destroy their feasibility.
Plaintiff should have the burden of proving that he had the
intent and the ability to maximize his sales volume. He has both
superior access to this information and the motive to adduce it.
If he meets the burden of proof on these two conditions, the court
should presume the existence of the third condition, leaving it to
defendant to prove that in some fashion, plaintiff either did or
should have recaptured his lost volume. This burden should be on
defendant for two reasons: the difficulty of plaintiff's negativing
the feasibility of all possible schemes for increasing volume, and
the probability that a commercial seller's self-interest more often
than not leads him to maximize his volume in all possible ways.
b. Valuing lost volume. If plaintiff succeeds in proving that
an invisible cost was the loss of as much volume of business as he
resold, there remains the problem of proving the value to plaintiff
of the lost volume. The value to him of lost volume is the
difference between the receipts that would have been received
from such additional sales, and the extra costs that would have been
involved had plaintiff made such additional sales. The price at
which plaintiff resold, or would have resold, is good evidence of the
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receipts he would have received from such additional sales. But
there is more difficulty in measuring what it would have cost
plaintiff to have made such additional sales.
Calculation of the variable costs that would have gone into such
additional sales is not too difficult; it is the overhead costs that give
difficulty. If plaintiff could have handled the additional sales
without any increase in his overhead costs, no overhead should be
taken into account. To the extent overhead would have had to be
increased it should be regarded in the calculations.102

c. Burden of proving the value of lost volume. Plaintiff should
have the burden of proving the value to him of the lost receipts.
Defendant should have the burden of proving the saved costs. The
rationale for this allocation is identical to the rationale for
handling overhead problems, discussed earlier at pages 590-92.
Were these rules accepted by a court, a plaintiff dealer suing a
customer who wrongfully refused to accept delivery would be welladvised to prove the following items during his case in chief: (1)
the unpaid balance of the price; (2) the price he did get or could
have gotten by resale of the rejected goods to another consumer;
(3) his intent to maximize his volume; (4) his ability to obtain
other goods like the ones defendant rejected for resale to the first
customer who came along after the breach; and (5) other
("visible") extra expenses of mitigation by resale.
Defendant would be well-advised to offer proof of (I) the
variable costs plaintiff saved on the original deal by virtue of the
breach, and (2) the total cost to plaintiff of an additional unit of
volume.
d. Lost volume treatment illustrated. Plaintiff is a car dealer
who contracted to deliver a new car to defendant buyer at a price
of $3,000, of which $100 was paid at the time of contracting. When
plaintiff tendered delivery of the car defendant wrongfully refused
to accept it. Plaintiff thereupon sued for damages after having
resold the car to another customer for $3,000. The basic measurement formula consists of the value to plaintiff of what defendant
failed to do less the value to plaintiff of what he saved, plus
incidental expenses caused by the breach.
102

Problems here are parallel to those discussed at pp. 588-92 supra.
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What defendant failed to do was pay the balance of the price.
That sum, $2,900, is our first term. What plaintiff saved consists
of two items at most: goods on hand at breach (the car) and
variable costs yet to be incurred. Since breach was not anticipatory
no variable costs were saved. The value to plaintiff of the saved
car is determined by the car's resale value with adjustments.
Whether we use actual or potential gross resale price the resale
value is $3,000 before adjustments.
The first adjustment is subtraction from $3,000 of all the
visible extra expenses involved in reselling the car. "Extra expenses" are those in excess of the expenses plaintiff would have
incurred had he completed performance with defendant. Let us
assume that the variable cost items involved in the resale are (1)
the cost of a credit check on the new buyer-$50-and (2) the
commission of the salesman who closed the deal with him-$300.
Both items are "extra" since they would not have been incurred to
sell this car, but for the breach. These two items must be subtracted from $3,000 to give the value to plaintiff of the car he
saved.
Moreover, if it appears plaintiff's resale of this car cost him
another car's sale, the $3,000 figure (value of what plaintiff saved)
must be further reduced by the value to plaintiff of this invisible
extra expense of resale. This figure consists of the difference
between the potential receipts of another unit of volume-$3,000
-and the potential expenses of such an additional sale. If
plaintiff's total variable costs involved in another sale (including
the cost of acquiring the car from the manufacturer) are $2,500,
and fixed costs are ignored, the value to plaintiff of the lost unit
of volume is $3,000 less $2,500, or $500.
Thus, plaintiff's savings from the breach consist of the value of
saved goods on hand ($3,000) reduced by the visible costs of
resale, i.e., the cost of a credit check ($50) and saleman's commission ($300) and further reduced by the invisible costs of resale,
i.e., the difference between the resale price of the car ($3,000)
and the total variable costs of reselling such a car ($2,500) .
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In tabular form the formula appears thus:
Unpaid balance of the price
Less savings from breach:
Saved goods on hand
Less extra costs of resale:
Visible:
Credit check
Sales commission
Total visible costs
Invisible:
Receipts from potential sale
Less costs of resale

$2,900
$3,000

$50
300
$350
$3,000
2,500

Total invisible costs

500

Total extra costs of resale

850

Total savings from breach

$2,150

Plaintiff's recovery

$750

In linear terms this would be:
$2,900-[[$3,000-($350
($3,000-$2,500)] ]] or
$2,900-[[$3,000-($350
$500] ]] or
$2,900-$2,150 = $750.

+

+

The figures in double brackets represent the value to plaintiff
of what he saved. The figures in single brackets represent the total
extra expense of resale. The figures in parentheses represent the
invisible extra expense of resale-the value to plaintiff of the loss
of one unit of volume.
The resale price of the car figures in the equation twice, once as
the value to plaintiff of saved goods on hand before adjustment, and
once as the minuend in a subtraction designed to fix the value to
plaintiff of the volume impaired by resale. Algebraic cancellation
of these two items permits the formula to be condensed thus:
unpaid balance of the price plus the visible extra expenses of
resale minus the variable costs of selling one more car. This works
out as $2,900 plus $350 minus $2,500.
If the breach was anticipatory, the formula becomes more
complex. Within the double brackets and outside the single
brackets will go a new positive term:· variable costs saved. For
example, if the breach occurred after the car was on hand but
before plaintiff had completed his work of preparing it for
customer delivery, variable cost items in the preparation process
would be introduced into the formula.
If the breach occurred before plaintiff was obligated to the
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manufacturer to accept delivery of the car, "saved goods on hand"
do not enter the picture; only saved variable costs need to be
taken into account. In this case the formula should read thus:
unpaid balance of the price ($2,900) minus saved variable costsall variable costs of an average sale ($2,500) less the two items not
saved, the credit check ($50) and the salesman's commission
($300) . Thus the formula, in dollar terms, is $2,900-$2,150, or
$750.
F. Non-Delegable Services
I. Valuation Problems
The saved "time" of persons who cannot delegate their duty of
rendering services cannot be valued at cost of replacement; it must
be valued by reference to its actual or potential resale price. It
must be valued at the higher of these two figures, actual resale
price or the price at which plaintiff could have resold his time by
reasonable effort to find the top-paying job which did not entail
undue risk or self-sacrificing.
If the potential resale price-what plaintiff could have earned
by reselling these non-delegable services elsewhere without undue
self-sacrifice-is higher than the actual resale price, mitigation
notions require that potential resale price be used. If actual resale
price is the higher-because the services were resold in a fashion
not required by mitigation notions-the actual resale price must
be used to satisfy the doctrinal requirement that breach-caused
gains to be taken into account. A similar interplay of the notions
of "mitigation" and "breach-caused gain" in a different context
was discussed previously.103
Three specific issues emerge: (I) what did plaintiff in fact earn
by resale of his released time? (2) if plaintiff had used reasonable
efforts to find the top-paying job which did not entail too much
self-sacrifice or risk on his part, would he have found a job? (3) if
the prior answer was affirmative, what would the job have paid?

2. Burden of Proof
On the first issue once again a situation emerges where plaintiff
has superior access to the evidence, and defendant is the only
person motivated to bring the evidence forward. For the reasons
103

See discussion at note 36 supra. And see discussion at pp. 607-08 infra.
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given in the discussion of overhead the burden should fall on
defendant in such a situation.
On the last two issues the parties are equal in their access to
the information and defendant is the only party motivated to
bring forward the information. The burden of proving these
items should thus fall on him:

II.

PLAINTIFF'S SAVINGS VALUED AS AN ENTITY

In rare instances plaintiff's "duty to mitigate" damages requires
that, upon notice of defendant's total breach, plaintiff not stop
work on the contract. Rather, he should complete fabrication and
resell the completed entity to some buyer other than defendant.
In these instances what plaintiff saved should be valued as an
"entity"-at the price the completed performance would bring
upon resale. The determination of when the "entity" approach to
valuatiop. is appropriate is best considered in the light of specific
contexts.

Illustration 1. Plaintiff-manufacturer agreed to fabricate and
deliver clocks to defendant-buyer's specifications. Defendant repudiated at a point where plaintiff had no clocks finished, many in
process, and much special raw material on hand. Should the court
value what plaintiff saved by reference to the price the clocks
would bring on the market if plaintiff completed fabrication after
notice of breach? Or is the better reference to the sum of the
values of the various components of plaintiff's as yet unrendered
performance: his as yet unincurred expenses for more raw
materials, his ability to divert his overhead facilities to other work,
his ability to sell the raw materials as raw materials and to sell the
unfinished clocks as scrap?
Illustration 2. Plaintiff publishes a magazine, and agreed to
design, set up and run weekly advertisements for defendant for
fifty-two weeks. After two weeks defendant repudiated. Should
the court value plaintiff's savings by reference to the resale value of
the entity-the space in the magazine which the ad would have
filled-or by reference to the components of plaintiff's performance
as yet unapplied to the contract when plaintiff learned of the
repudiation-his variable costs still unincurred on the rest of the
contract?
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Application of the Entity Approach

The choice must be made with regard both to the mitigation
notion and to the notion that breach-caused gains are to be taken
into account whether or not mitigation obligated the plaintiff to
take the risks involved in making such gains. Four basic situations
can arise: (I) upon notice of breach plaintiff completes the process
of fabrication and resells the entity to a new buyer, and at trial
he wants his savings measured by reference to the resale value of
the entity; (2) upon notice of breach plaintiff does not complete
the process of fabrication and at trial he resists defendant's efforts
to measure plaintiff's opportunity to save by reference to the
probable resale value of the entity; (3) upon notice of breach
plaintiff does not complete fabrication and resale of the entity, but
at trial he wants to value his savings by reference to the potential
resale price of the entity rather than by reference to his saved
components of performance; (4) upon notice of breach plaintiff
completes fabrication and resells the entity, but at trial he resists
defendant's efforts to value the savings by reference to the resale
receipts actually gleaned, arguing for valuation by reference to
the components as they stood when notice of breach was received.
In the first two situations, if defendant raises no objection to
plaintiff's valuation technique the court should raise none. If
defendant objects, defendant should have the burden of proving
that the notion of mitigation obligated plaintiff to take the opposite
course from that which he in fact took. Defendant should be
obligated to prove not only that in the light of hindsight the
plaintiff's alternative course of action would have resulted in lower
damages, but also that plaintiff should have known this at the time
he exercised his choice. The burden should be placed on
defendant, rather than plaintiff, because it is more likely than not
that plaintiff's self-interest will lead him to use reasonable selfprotective care upon breach. It is the rare plaintiff who is so sure
he will later prevail at trial that he is careless of present loss. By
putting the burden of proof on defendant the court increases the
likelihood that the result reached in cases where the burden is not
carried will correspond to the true state of facts.
Even if defendant carries the burden of proof described above,
plaintiff should be permitted to rebut by showing that the course
advocated now by defendant, although more economical, would
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have been impractical or perilous for plaintiff for valid commercial
or personal reasons. Plaintiff should have the burden of showing
such reasons since defendant cannot anticipate and negative all
possible reasons of this sort.
In the last two situations, where plaintiff wants his savings
valued in a fashion different from the course of action which he
actually took upon notice of breach, if defendant has no objection,
the court should have none. However, if defendant insists upon
valuing plaintiff's savings by reference to the course of action
actually pursued by plaintiff the court should sustain defendant's
objection. The plaintiff's objection to reference to his actual course
of action must rest on the fallacious argument that inasmuch as he
was not obligated to take the course he took (which turned out to
be very effective in mitigating the effects of breach) , the court should
not "penalize" him by subtracting his actual savings thus achieved at
his own risk. The fallacy of plaintiff's position has been noted
before: defendant's position does not rest on the mitigation notion,
but on a separate principle-that plaintiff's breach-caused gains
be taken into account.
B.

Valuation of the Entity

It is the rare case in which (a) entity valuation of what plaintiff
saved will give a different answer from separate valuation of each
component and (b) entity valuation is appropriate. In those rare
instances, however, problems of valuation of the entity should be
handled in the same way as similar problems of valuation of goods
or choses on hand. The entity thus will be valued by reference to
its resale value, adjusted to reflect incidental damages and reduction in plaintiff's total volume.
C.

Timing of the Decision To Use the Entity Approach

In the bulk of cases, neither counsel raises the possibility of
using an entity approach to valuation. In some cases both counsel
assume without question that an entity approach will be used.
But in the fairly rare case in which counsel disagree as to whether
the entity or the components approach is appropriate, it is most desirable to resolve that question before the actual trial begins. If resolution of that question is postponed until after all the evidence is
in, each counsel must guess, before and during trial, which approach

.
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the tribunal will take. Counsel therefore faces this unhappy choice:
offer proof in the alternative-with the confusion and extra
preparation which that involves-or take a guess, with the chance
that the case will be lost because he guessed wrong. Moreover, if
the issue is not resolved before trial, there is the chance that at
least one attorney will overlook the possibility that this issue might
arise, and will assume erroneously, but with confidence, that a
components approach will be used.
Everything said thus far argues for pretrial resolution of the
question. But our procedural habits restrict our ability to resolve
such questions before the start of trial. The hallowed way of
resolving such questions before trial is -by giving one party an
option, and deeming him to have exercised it by the way he pleads
or fails to plead. Our question, however, should not be left to the
option of either party. It should be resolved by agreement of the
parties-if they can be brought to agree-or by an order of the
tribunal according to the rules suggested in the previous section.
The appropriate time for such an agreement or ruling is at a
pretrial conference of the trial judge and trial counsel, held
sufficiently late in the pretrial history of the case that counsel will
know their facts, but sufficiently in advance of trial that counsel
may adjust their trial preparations to take the ruling into account.
Judges would be well-advised, wherever possible, to pre-try at
least the damage issue of every contract case in which either the
court or one counsel evidences a desire to resolve before trial the
question of entity or components valuation. Of course, the pretrial
conference cannot resolve legal questions which turn on disputed
facts if counsel cannot agree sufficiently on the resolution of these
disputes. In such cases, resolution of the entity-components question must await the end of the fact-finding process. But even in
these instances where pretrial fails to bring about a resolution of
this question, it will at least serve to alert counsel to the risks they
run on this issue, and, if the pretrial judge is also the trial judge,
it will serve to educate him on the issue.
Where this matter cannot be resolved until fact-finding is
completed, the fact-finding upon which it depends should be done
by the court, not the jury, even in jury cases. The choice between
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entity and component valuation should be categorized as a "question of law." To submit it to the jury, with complex instructions
as to its resolution and an additional set of alternative instructions
as to how the jury should proceed after it resolves this question,
is to guarantee confusion.

